PHILOSOPHY-NEUROSCIENCE:
PROBLEMS TO SOLVE

(with an invitation to contribute)



- Should the functions of creativity, freedom, intuition and symbolisation (and other similar ones) manifest themselves as mere epiphenomena of the brain, what more would be left of Homo Sapiens?

- If the DNA of a chimpanzee differs only by 1.6% from that of the human being, is it only this difference which constitutes the Person as a subject?

Or is there more?

- How can matter be phenomenologically conscious?

How can, what is physical, generate the non-physical or a mental cause (non-physical) generate a behavioral effect (physical) without violating the laws of mass, energy and quantity of motion conservation?

- Who is this "I" observing itself?

- In what way would physical processes transform into a subjective experience?

- The consciousness of the self is permanent and unchangeable in the whole course of life, except in the case of serious mental illness. As a matter of fact, we do not perceive inner ageing but only the bodily one. If this premise is legitimate, the persistence of subjective consciousness appears in contrast with the continuous biological renewal of a neural network which, moreover, is subject to the strict law of cause-effect.

If there is a difference, gap or surplus between existing as biological subjects and existing as consciousness of self, if we exclude the model of the Soul what constitutes this difference, this gap?

- What prevents one from supposing that the creative, intuitive, imaginative, symbolical gap between physical and non-physical, is precisely a tangible and operative metaphysical sign changed with the highest value and meaning, to the extent that it constitutes the only difference between Nature and Person?

- The opinion is false that the metaphysical, to legitimate itself, must not be "physical": it is the term "physical" that is limitating and should simply be substituted by "reality", which is equally physical and non-physical.

 

prodena@libero.it

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